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COURTS AND ARBITRATION:  RECONCILING THE PUBLIC WITH THE PRIVATE 
By 




Arbitration is an accepted form of dispute settlement in many countries, including the 
United States.  Perhaps “popular” is a better description given the many lawyers and experts around 
the world now working in the field of arbitration and the many articles and conferences devoted 
to the subject.  
Yet over the past decade, and the past few years, in particular, the tide has subtly shifted.  
In essays and lectures, two distinguished judges from separate common law countries have 
questioned the fact of and the process by which private actors control dispute resolution.  In 2002, 
Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit lamented the 
decline of trials and trial lawyers.1  His focus was on shortcomings in judicial procedure, which 
gave rise to alternative dispute resolution, mainly mediation, and arbitration.  Implicit in his 
assessment is that federal and state laws, along with judicial precedent, have opened the door for 
arbitrators to encroach on the judicial function.  He has repeated his gentle critique in various 
essays and articles.2  Fast forward to 2016, when the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, 
Lord Thomas, questioned arbitration’s interference in law-making.  In his Bailii Lecture titled 
“Developing Commercial Law through the Courts:  Rebalancing the Relationship between the 
Courts and Arbitration,” Lord Chief Justice Thomas called for a new balance between courts and 
arbitration.3   
Government officials, civil society and the media have joined in questioning arbitration, 
along with taking aim at globalization and another form of arbitration, investor-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS).4  Although the criticism of ISDS differs in certain respects as the arbitration 
                                                          
*Associate Dean for International and Comparative Legal Studies and Burnett Family Professional Lecturer in 
International and Comparative Law and Policy, George Washington University Law School.  I am grateful to my GW 
Law colleagues, Professor Gregory E. Maggs and Professor Alan B. Morrison, for their insights into issues relating to 
arbitration.  Thanks also to the staff of the Penn State Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation.  
  
1 Patrick E. Higginbotham, Essay: Judge Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr., Memorial Lecture, Loyola University School of 
Law: So Why Do We Call Them Trial Courts? 55 SMU L. REV. 1405, 1405 (2002) [hereinafter Higginbotham, Trial 
Courts].     
 
2 See, e.g., Patrick E. Higginbotham, The Disappearing Trial and Why We Should Care, RAND REVIEW (2004), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/periodicals/rand-review/issues/summer2004/28.html [hereinafter Higginbotham, 
Disappearing Trial]; Patrick E. Higginbotham, The Present Plight of the United States District Courts, 60 DUKE L. J. 
745, 752-55 (2010) [hereinafter Higginbotham, Present Plight].  
 
3 The Right. Hon. The Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, Developing Commercial 
Law through the Courts:  Rebalancing the Relationship between the Courts and Arbitration, THE BAILII LECTURE 
2016 (Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/lcj-speech-bailli-lecture-
20160309.pdf [hereinafter Thomas, Rebalancing Courts and Arbitration].   
 
4 See, e.g., Michael Nolan, Challenges to the Credibility of the Investor-State Arbitration System, 5 AM. U. BUS. L. 
REV. 429, 429 (2016). 
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involves a sovereign, at its heart is the concern that arbitration is a private process yet disputes are 
inherently of public concern.5   
According to the critics, arbitrators are chosen and compensated by the parties and they 
largely act behind closed doors; courts, however, have mandates under constitutions to resolve 
legal differences, particularly those of public significance, and do so in an open way.6       
In light of these developments, have courts become more skeptical of arbitration?  Are there 
mechanisms under domestic arbitration laws or other legal authorities for courts to address the 
concerns?   
 
II. THE CRITIQUE 
 
Questioning arbitration is not new.  What is new is that after years of arbitration’s 
entrenchment in commercial matters and its relative success in meeting the needs of disputing 
parties and relieving overburdened courts, prominent judges are publicly suggesting that 
arbitration is hampering the law, in general.    
The argument of Judge Higginbotham and Lord Chief Justice Thomas differs from 
common concerns about arbitration, namely that individuals may be coerced into signing 
arbitration clauses or that certain subjects or relationships, such as consumer matters, should not 
be arbitrated.7  Instead, their critique is about arbitration’s perceived effect on law-making; that is, 
areas of law once defined by judges are not being developed by way of public judicial decisions.  
Further, due to its secrecy, arbitration betrays democracy as the public is denied access to dispute 
resolution.     
On the age-old concerns about arbitration, the United States enacted the Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA) in 1925 after judicial resistance to arbitration.8  Further, although the United States was 
at the United Nations’ negotiating table in 1958 for the New York Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (NY Convention), it did not ratify the NY 
Convention and enact implementing legislation until 1970.9  Again, the judiciary had reservations 
yet there were also federalism issues, given state anti-arbitration laws.10    
Other countries have been cautious about arbitration.  For years, Latin American countries 
adhered to the Calvo Doctrine and insisted that respective local courts were the exclusive fora for 
                                                          
5 GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 9-11 (2007). 
 
6 See Judith Resnik, Feature, Arbitration, Transparency and Privatization: Diffusing Disputes:  The Public in the 
Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2804-05 (2015). 
 
7 See, e.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-
the-deck-of-justice.html?_r=0.  
 
8 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U. S. 440, 443 (2006).  
 
9 Susan L. Karamanian, The Road to the Tribunal and Beyond:  International Commercial Arbitration and United 
States Courts, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 17, 29-31 (2002).    
 




dispute resolution.11  Although a number of these states shifted toward arbitration in the 1980s 
with the rise of foreign direct investment, some, such as Brazil, were still reluctant to accept 
arbitration.  Brazil has now adopted an arbitration law and became a party to the NY Convention 
in 2002.12  Or as another example, India enacted the Arbitration and Conciliation Act in 1996.13  
The law aside, courts in India were slow to embrace arbitration.14  India later enacted the 
Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Ordinance 2015 and an amending act, which were 
designed “to bring the existing 1996 Arbitration Act further into line with international 
standards.”15   
In a number of States, including the United States and the United Kingdom, arbitration is 
now common.  So when prominent judges from these countries question what many litigants and 
their lawyers perceive to be a success relative to the costs and benefits of litigating in court, it 
should give reason to pause.        
In the United States, the modern questioning of arbitration’s influence on law-making 
started in earnest more than a decade ago with Judge Higginbotham.  Of note, his original focus 
was on the declining number of trials, and this fundamental concern continues to drive his 
assessment.  In his Judge Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr. Memorial Lecture, presented at Loyola 
University School of Law in 2002, he lamented that in recent years “[j]udges seemed to be 
spending more time on matters other than trials.”16 In assessing the causes, one of them is 
arbitration.  According to Judge Higginbotham, the U.S. Supreme Court’s endorsement of 
arbitration “validates formal rejections of the courthouse.”17  A few years later in an essay titled 
“The Disappearing Trial and Why We Should Care,” published by the Rand Corporation, Judge 
Higginbotham observed that ADR, including arbitration, is one of the reasons for the “anti-trial 
culture” in civil cases.18   In 2010, Judge Higginbotham, in an often-cited article in Duke Law 
Journal, “The Present Plight of the United States District Courts,” noted that “[t]he faces of the 
United States district courts are fading.”19  As he described, arbitration has aided in the decline of 
courts: 
                                                          
11Bernardo M. Cremades, Disputes Arising Out of Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America: A New Look at 
the Calvo Doctrine and Other Jurisdictional Issues, 59 DISP. RESOL. J. 78, 80 (2004).   
 
12 Leonardos de Campos Melo, Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards in Brazil, 24 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 113, 115-
18 (2013). 
 
13 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, No. 26 of 1996, INDIA CODE (1996). 
 
14 See Amelia C. Rendeiro, Indian Arbitration and “Public Policy,” 89 TEX. L. REV. 699, 709-10; 720-22 (2011). 
 
15 See Joseph (Yusef) Saei, Indian Executive’s Pro-Arbitration Power Move Sanctioned by Parliament:  Transnational 
Ideals versus National Reality, 41 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1, 1-2 (2016), https://campuspress.yale.edu/yjil/files/ 
2016/09/saei-website-ready-1-2itw31n.pdf (noting that the reform measures “include mandatory referral to 
arbitration, permission of interim measures in international cases, a narrowed public policy review, and arbitral time 
limits and fast-track procedures”).    
 
16 Higginbotham, Trial Courts, supra note 1, at 1405. 
 
17 Id. at 1414. 
 
18 Higginbotham, Disappearing Trial, supra note 2, at 3. 
 
19 Higginbotham, Present Plight, supra note 2, at 745.  
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… arbitration and ADR are relevant to this examination of the vanishing trial not 
so much for their abstract value but for their insights upon the strengths and 
weaknesses of the federal trial courts and as significant parts of the milieu in which 
we ponder the courts’ difficulties and private dispute resolution’s ease.20 
 
Across the Atlantic Ocean, another prominent judge, the Lord Chief Justice of England and 
Wales, was pondering the issue of the declining role of courts, mainly decisions of appellate courts 
on international commercial matters.  His observations were made known in his 2016 Bailii 
Lecture.21  According to Lord Chief Justice Thomas, arbitration has diverted cases away from 
courts, “reduc[ing] the potential for the courts to develop and explain the law.”22  Further, 
“resolution of disputes firmly behind closed doors” results in “retarding public understanding of 
the law, and public debate over its application.”23  
Indeed, Lord Chief Justice Thomas’s concern about the lack of the development of the 
common law in areas of trade and finance echoed Judge Higginbotham’s Rand essay.  In 2004, 
Judge Higginbotham described as “disconcerting … the potential loss of focus on the intent of the 
controlling case law in these cases” and “the perils of ‘private justice’ in a system designed to be 
public and non-discriminatory.”24   He did not develop his argument in great detail but his concern 
was duly noted.    
According to Judge Higginbotham and Lord Chief Justice Thomas, dispute resolution is 
not solely about resolving differences between parties.  Courts in common law jurisdictions play 
an essential public function. In a more pointed manner, Lord Chief Justice Thomas urged that “it 
must always be remembered that: 
 
a. It is the courts that develop the law.  Arbitration does not. 
b. Courts articulate and explain rights, including definitive rulings on the scope 
and interpretation of contractual clauses, financial instruments and so on.  
Arbitration does not. 
c. As has been very rightly noted, ‘open court proceedings enable people to 
watch, debate, develop, contest, and materialize the exercise of both public 
and private power.’ Arbitration does not.” 25  
 
To address the situation, Lord Chief Justice Thomas urged a more liberal standard to appeal 
arbitration cases, particularly “where the question is one of general public importance.”26  Further, 
                                                          
20 Higginbotham, Present Plight, supra note 2, at 755. 
 
21 Thomas, Rebalancing Courts and Arbitration, supra note 3. 
 
22 Id. at 10, ¶ 22. 
 
23 Id. at 10, ¶ 23.  Cf. Pinsent Masons, Insurance & Reinsurance, Arbitration: Is Secrecy Damaging the Market? (Sept. 
2007) (referencing a similar argument made by Appeal Court Judge Lord Justice Rix in his 2007 Bathurst Memorial 
Lecture). 
 
24 Higginbotham, Disappearing Trial, supra note 2, at 4.  
 
25 Thomas, Rebalancing Courts and Arbitration, supra note 3, at 17-18, ¶ 49.  
 
26 Id. at 13, ¶ 34. 
5 
 
he suggested that courts be given broader power “to give decisions on points of law which arise 
after the commencement of an arbitration but before the decision.”27  
Lord Chief Justice Thomas’s remarks immediately prompted considerable discussion and debate.  
Concerned that his “re-balance” message was misunderstood as a frontal assault on arbitration, in 
July 2016 he explained:   
 
Many thought that I had made an attack on arbitration.  It certainly was not …it is 
very, very undesirable that we are entering into a stage where great legal minds 
have retired from the bench, are giving awards and setting out principles which are 
known only to the cognoscenti.  This is not good.  So I think there is a very fruitful 
avenue here in exploring this.28   
 
Other judges in the United States have joined Judge Higginbotham in challenging 
arbitration. U.S. federal district court Judge Terry R. Means, in response to Judge Higginbotham, 
while not agreeing that the declining number of trials is necessarily bad, wrote that “the rise of 
arbitration as a substitute for trial in the federal and state district courts is a trend fraught with 
danger.”29 Judge Means, while concerned about the lax approach to evidence in arbitration, also 
noted: 
Arbitration proceedings are conducted in private and before a privately paid 
arbitrator, beholden to some extent to those who bring him business, and who has 
not faced the vetting of the public at state election or the confirmation process of a 
federal judge.30  
   
Or, as another example, a federal district judge recognized that arbitration allows 
businesses to avoid public accountability.  In one of many essays in The New York Times about 
arbitration, Judge William G. Young of the U.S. Federal District Court of Massachusetts stated 
that arbitration “is among the most profound shifts in our legal history” and “[o]minously, business 
has a good chance of opting out of the legal system altogether and misbehaving without 
reproach.”31 
 
In a recent book, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer reminded courts to focus on 
public policy in arbitration cases. He did not get in the middle of the Judge Higginbotham-Lord 
Chief Justice Thomas discussion, yet noted that the failure to rigorously assess arbitration could 
allow it to run roughshod over policy concerns:  “courts that pay little or no attention to their 
                                                          
27 Thomas, Rebalancing Courts and Arbitration, supra note 3, at 13, ¶ 35.  
 
28 The Right Hon. The Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, LAUNCH OF 
THECITYUK’S LEGAL SERVICES REPORT 2016 at 4, ¶ 16 (July 20, 2016), https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/10/lcj-speech-launch-of-thecityuk-legal-services-report-2016.pdf.  
 
29 Terry R. Means, Point-Counterpoint:  Two Judges’ Perspectives on Trial by Jury:  What’s So Great about a Trial 
Anyway? A Reply to Judge Higginbotham’s Eldon B. Mahon Lecture of October 27, 2004, 12 TEX WESLEYAN L. REV. 
513, 518-19 (2006).  
 
30 Id. at 519. 
 




nation’s public policies can create, out of arbitration, a procedural method for nullifying those 
policies.”32 
Academics, as well, have shaped the criticism.  Notable among them is Professor Judith 
Resnik of Yale Law School.  She has examined the historical underpinnings and significance of 
the public in the U.S. legal system.  In her mind, arbitration challenges the constitutional allocation 
of power due to “insufficient oversight of the processes it has mandated as a substitute for 
adjudication and shifting control over third-party access away from courts and to the organizations 
conducting arbitrations and the commercial enterprises drafting arbitration clauses.”33  Likewise, 
Professor Amy Schmitz, in examining arbitration’s privacy, has observed that even in some public 
arbitrations involving sports there is a failure “to produce public law,” which can have 
ramifications when cases relating to “matters of health and safety [] escape public scrutiny.”34 
In sum, the challenge to arbitration comes from a variety of sources.  Although not widespread 
and dominating the discourse about dispute resolution, it is biting.  Democratic values and the 
accepted form of law-making in common law systems are considered under threat. 
   
III. THE RESPONSE TO THE CRITIQUE 
 
The argument that arbitration inhibits the development of the law is curious.  First, for 
those who have witnessed the growth of mediation since the 1970s, which encourages parties to 
settle their claims, it is odd that arbitration’s removal of cases from the judicial docket would be 
considered a negative development.  Indeed, lawsuits exist due to differences between parties.  
Surely, if parties are free to settle their differences, a practice that federal and state rules of civil 
procedure encourage, they should be free to remove the case from court and have another 
adjudicator, the arbitrator, resolve it.      
Second, the attack on the decline in law-making due to arbitration is not entirely 
substantiated.  What gaps in the law exist due to arbitration?  One need only look at the many 
federal and state reporters of legal opinions, which have grown exponentially over the years, and 
wonder if there is a serious problem.  If legal standards are lacking, surely corporations and 
individuals, the parties to lawsuits, would be expressing concern.  Observers of the law in the 
United States, such as law professors, lawyers, and students, would be devoting energy and time 
to pointing out the lacunae and insisting on clarity.   
Nevertheless Judge Higginbotham’s challenge has some merit.  My colleague, Professor 
Gregory E. Maggs, an expert in commercial law, has noted the absence of judicial opinions in the 
field of credit card contracts.35  While it is generally believed that all credit card contracts have 
arbitration clauses, it appears this is not quite correct.36  Nevertheless, due to arbitration or for 
other reasons, the law relating to certain aspects of their use is not developed.  For example, under 
                                                          
32 STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW GLOBAL REALITIES 194 (2015). 
 
33 Resnik, supra note 6, at 2810.  
 
34 Amy J. Schmitz, Secrecy and Transparency in Dispute Resolution: Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 
54 KAN. L. REV. 1211, 1217 (2006). 
 
35 Conversation with Gregory E. Maggs, Professor, George Washington University Law School (Mar. 17, 2017). 
 




the Truth in Lending Act, a credit card holder is not liable for amounts exceeding $50 due to 
unauthorized use of the card.37  When fraudulent activity occurs above the $50 amount, the credit 
card company may seek to push back the charges on the merchant.  Logically, when faced with 
this request, the merchant may challenge whether the activity was unauthorized in the first 
instance.  According to Professor Maggs, there is a dearth of cases dealing with what would 
constitute authorized v. unauthorized conduct to guide the merchant as to that issue.  Further, the 
holder of a business card may have recurring charges.  At what point is the holder estopped from 
seeking to limit liability?  Again, the case law is limited.   Professor Maggs also referenced 15 
U.S.C. section 1666i, which gives the credit card holder defenses under state law when the 
transaction was in the same State as the mailing address that the credit card holder provided “or 
was within 100 miles from such address.”38  Would the defenses under section 1666i apply when 
the purchase is made via the internet through Amazon?   According to Professor Maggs, the case 
law is not fully developed on this issue.   
Lord Chief Justice Thomas was not as specific in identifying substantive gaps in commercial law.  
Instead, he observed:   
 
… across many sectors of law traditionally developed in London, particularly 
relating to the construction industry, engineering, shipping, insurance and 
commodities, there is a real concern which has been expressed to me at the lack of 
case law on standard form contracts and on changes in commercial practice.39   
 
In response, however, Sir Bernard Eder, formerly of the High Court of England and Wales, 
has noted that “the common law continues to develop at a pace with a constant stream-indeed 
flood-of cases over a wide area of jurisprudence.”40  
If allowing greater judicial engagement is needed in the arbitration process, merely for the 
sake of enabling the development of the common law, then at what cost?  As Lord Saville, former 
Supreme Court Justice and chair of the UK’s Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration 
Law, asked pointedly in response to the Lord Chief Justice:  Why should the parties “be obliged 
to finance the development of English commercial law?”41 The cost:  it would “drive international 
commercial arbitration away from London, to the great loss of this country.”42 And it would further 
signal a lack of respect for party autonomy as to arbitration yet not as to mediation.43   
                                                          
37 The Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (a)(1)(B) (2017). 
 
38 15 U.S.C. § 1666i(a)(3).   
 
39 Thomas, Rebalancing Courts and Arbitration, supra note 3, at 10-11, ¶ 23. 
 
40Sir Bernard Eder, Essex Court Chambers, Keynote Address at the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (London 
Branch): Does arbitration stifle development of the law?  Should s. 69 be revitalised? 4, ¶ 10 (Apr. 28, 2016), 
http://arias.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/CIArb-EDER-AGM-Keynote-Address-28-April-2016-AMND.pdf. 






43 Id. (quoting Lord Devlin, who in 1979 observed that “[t]he next step would, I suppose, be a prohibition placed on 
the settlement of cases concerning interesting points of law”). 
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A more compelling concern is arbitration’s removal of matters from public purview.  Due 
to arbitration, no doubt cases of public significance are being handled outside of the public realm.  
Yet, is arbitration completely removed from any scrutiny?  As noted below, various arbitration 
agreements and awards are vetted by courts and the judiciary is engaged in other aspects of the 
arbitration process.     
 
 
IV. JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT ON THE ISSUE:  PAST AND FUTURE 
 
Arbitration is not exclusively private.  The irony is that courts are essential to arbitration’s 
smooth functioning.44  When parties have entered into a written agreement to arbitrate, one of them 
may need to seek judicial intervention to enforce the agreement.  In the United States, for example, 
the FAA recognizes that arbitration agreements are enforceable like any contract and that courts 
can stay judicial proceedings and order arbitration.45  During the arbitration, the law of the place 
of arbitration may enable a party to ask a court for orders regarding appearance of witnesses and 
production of documents.46  After an arbitration award has been entered, a party may need to seek 
judicial enforcement of the award,47 or the non-prevailing party may seek to vacate the award 
under the law of the place of arbitration.48  As to an award under the New York Convention, a 
court may not enforce it for a number of fairly technical reasons yet it does recognize that a 
violation of public policy could give grounds for non-enforcement.49  In addition to FAA grounds 
for not confirming or vacating an award, certain U.S. courts have devised other standards to vacate 
an award, including, as to domestic arbitration awards, manifest disregard of the law.50  Of 
additional note, arbitrating disputes involving a patent is far from shrouded in secrecy as the 
arbitral award is required to be filed with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.51 So, have 
statutory and other mechanisms enabled courts to perform the guardian role as to matters of public 
concern?    
Courts are engaged on public issues as they relate to arbitration. This focus has occurred at 
various stages of the arbitration process.  It belies the notion that arbitrations are entirely secret.  
Further, it signals that courts are more than by-standers.  In fact, courts are generating substantial 
law related to the arbitration itself.  This development may not satisfy those concerned about the 
                                                          
44 See generally Frances T. Freeman Jalet, Judicial Review of Arbitration: The Judicial Attitude, 45 CORNELL L. REV. 
519 (1960). 
 
45 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 2-4; see also 9 U.S.C. §§ 202, 206. 
 
46 Id. § 7.  
 
47 Id. § 9; see also id. § 207. 
 
48 Id. § 10. 
 
49 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 
[hereinafter NY Convention]. 
 
50 See Amina Dammann, Vacating Arbitration Awards for Mistakes of Fact, 27 REV. LITIG. 441, 443 (2008). 




lack of published judicial opinions on certain substantive issues but, at a minimum, it evidences 
new jurisprudence, one of public value.      
For example, U.S. courts have woven an entire body of law on when an arbitration clause 
acts to waive the right to proceed as a class action.  In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp. 
the U.S. Supreme Court exercised considerable review by holding that an arbitral tribunal cannot 
conduct a case as a class action when the arbitration clause did not so provide.52 This conclusion 
is logical given that arbitration is founded in contract.  Further, as the Court noted, important public 
policy concerns would be raised by “the shift from bilateral arbitration to class-action 
arbitration.”53  A year later in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Court summarized the 
concerns as follows: 
 
Classwide arbitration includes absent parties, necessitating additional and different 
procedures and involving higher stakes.  Confidentiality becomes more difficult.  
And while it is theoretically possible to select an arbitrator with some expertise 
relevant to the class-certification question, arbitrators are not generally 
knowledgeable in the often-dominant procedural aspects of certification, such as 
the protection of absent parties.54 
 
In Concepcion, the Court examined California’s Discover Bank rule, under which a class 
action waiver in an arbitration agreement in certain consumer contracts was unconscionable and 
thus, not enforceable.55 The rule also authorized a party to a consumer contract to demand class-
wide arbitration after the fact.56  The lower courts had ruled in the plaintiffs’ favor and refused to 
compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause in a cellular telephone contract with AT&T.57 
The Supreme Court found that the FAA pre-empted the Discover Bank rule and thus reversed the 
lower court.58  Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court in DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia reviewed a 
contract in which California customers agreed to arbitrate.59  The clause, however, prohibited class 
arbitration and provided that if the “law of your state” disallows the waiver of class arbitration, 
then the arbitration clause “is unenforceable.”60  The Court, relying on Concepcion, held that a 
California court’s reading of the contract, which struck down the arbitration clause, was 
                                                          
52 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Intl’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 687 (2010). 
 
53 Id. at 686. 
 
54 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348 (2011). 
 
55 Id. at 340. 
 
56 Id. at 346.  
 
57 Id. at 337-38.  
 
58 Id. at 352. 
 
59 DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 466 (2015). 
 




inconsistent with other approaches a California court would take to a contract and thus did not put 
the arbitration clause on the same footing as a contract.61 
The judiciary’s conversation about the relationship between arbitration and class claims is 
not ending.62  The U.S. Supreme Court recently granted the petition for writ of certiorari on 
whether the National Labor Relations Act’s requirement of collective bargaining precludes 
enforcement of an arbitration clause that mandates arbitration on an individual verses a collective 
basis.63  The critical aspect of the case is the perceived conflict between two federal laws that 
reflect entrenched principles, namely, freedom of contract and the mandatory federal regime 
supporting employees’ rights to act in concert.  In short, the Court will be afforded the opportunity 
to shed insight into two issues of public significance and generate critical legal analysis in the 
process.    
       Another example of judicial engagement in the arbitration realm is jurisprudence on when 
a non-signatory to an arbitration clause could compel arbitration or be bound to arbitrate.   The 
U.S. Supreme Court recognized in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction 
that non-parties cannot be compelled to arbitrate.64 The rationale is consistent with the fundamental 
notion that arbitration is grounded in consent.  Nevertheless, U.S. courts have carved out 
exceptions to this rule.  To hold otherwise could mean inefficiency due to the likelihood of multiple 
courts and tribunals examining identical issues and the possibility of conflicting decisions.  Also, 
the FAA requires a court to compel arbitration when there is “an agreement in writing” yet it does 
not mandate that a party in the lawsuit be a party to that agreement.  Hence, in Arthur Andersen 
LLP v. Carlisle, the Supreme Court opened the door for application of state law principles in 
determining the status of non-signatories.65  As Justice Antonin Scalia wrote:  “If a written 
arbitration provision is made enforceable against (or for the benefit of) a third party under state 
contract law, the statute's terms are fulfilled.”66 
Relying on the principle of equitable estoppel, courts have recognized that non-parties can 
compel arbitration.67   In a similar vein, non-parties can be bound to arbitrate in certain instances.68  
The cases are many and the volume does not appear to be slowing.   
                                                          
61 Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, at 471. 
 
62 See Jill I. Gross, The Uberization of Arbitration Clauses, 9 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION -- (2017).  
 
63 Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 85 U.S.L.W. 3340, 85 U.S.L.W. 3343 
(U.S. Jan. 13, 2017) (No. 16-285) (No. 16-300) (No. 16-307). 
 
64 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1983).   
 
65 Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 630-31 (2009). 
 
66 Id. at 631.  
 
67 Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Application of Equitable Estoppel by Nonsignatory to Compel Arbitration – 
Federal Cases, 39 A.L.R. FED. 2d 17 (2009) (discussing multiple legal principles as to why a party to an arbitration 
clause could be estopped from preventing a non-party from compelling arbitration and identifying cases applying the 
principles).  
 
68  Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Application of Equitable Estoppel to Compel Arbitration by or Against 




Also, an arbitration award could benefit non-parties to the arbitration in a later lawsuit.  In 
Lenox MacLaren Surgical Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s award of summary judgment, which dismissed the plaintiff’s claims 
for monopolization and attempted monopolization under the Sherman Act.69  The defendants in 
the lawsuit were entities affiliated with Medtronic, Inc.70 One of the grounds for dismissal was that 
the plaintiff had arbitrated claims against a non-party to the case and thus it was precluded from 
re-litigating the claim.71  By the plaintiff’s admission, the nonparty, MSD USA, was affiliated with 
Medtronic and other Medtronic subsidiaries so that the Medtronic entities constituted a single 
enterprise.72  In the previous case, a federal district court stayed the case pending the plaintiff’s 
arbitration against MSD USA; after arbitration, the federal district court confirmed the arbitral 
award, which was in favor of the plaintiff, and entered an order dismissing all claims with 
prejudice.73  According to the Tenth Circuit, before dismissing the case, the plaintiff should have 
amended its complaint and asserted claims against the antitrust defendants even though those 
claims were not subject to arbitration.74   
U.S. courts are not the only ones engaged in guiding parties and tribunals as to non-parties.  
Courts in numerous jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom and Singapore, have issued 
published decisions on when a non-party can or cannot be part of an arbitration.75   
Second, in addition to generating considerable new law related to enforcing the agreement 
to arbitrate and the consequences of arbitration, courts are active in supervising certain aspects of 
the arbitration process.  In the United States, under the FAA, “the arbitrators …. or a majority of 
them, may summon in writing any person to attend before them or any of them as a witness and in 
a proper case to bring with him or them” documents material to the case.76   U.S. courts have the 
power to enforce this provision.77  As a result, and not without surprise, U.S. courts have been 
asked to guide tribunals and parties on evidentiary matters arising out of Section 7.  For example, 
in Stolt-Nielsen Transportation Group, Inc. v. Celanese AG, the Second Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s order that non-parties appear pursuant to a subpoena before the tribunal to present 
testimony and requested documents.78  The court recognized that such a hearing is not a pre-merits 
                                                          
69 Lenox MacLaren Surgical Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 847 F.3d 1221, 1246 (10th Cir. 2017).   The Tenth Circuit 
affirmed on the basis of claim preclusion, which is different than the grounds for the district court’s dismissal.  Id. at 
1246.  
 
70 Id. at 1226-28, 1235. 
 
71 Id. at 1245-46. 
 
72 Id. at 1230. 
 
73 Id. at 1228-29. 
 
74 Medtronic, 847 F.3d at 1245. 
 
75See William W. Park, Non-Signatories and International Contracts: An Arbitrator’s Dilemma, IN MULTIPLE PARTY 
ACTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 1 (Belinda Macmahon ed., 2009). 
 




78 Stolt-Nielsen Transp. Grp., Inc. v. Celanese AG, 430 F.3d 567, 581 (2d Cir. 2005). 
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discovery expedition as all arbitrators were present and they heard testimony and ruled on 
admissibility of evidence.79  Since Stolt-Nielsen, the Second Circuit and other courts of appeal 
have clarified that Section 7 does not authorize the pre-arbitration discovery from non-parties and 
have ordered lower district courts to quash subpoenas directed at non-parties.80 At least one other 
circuit court has held that Section 7 allows arbitrators to subpoena relevant documents before the 
hearing, even as to a non-party at least when the latter was “integrally related to the underlying 
arbitration.”81  
Further, under 28 U.S.C. section 1782, Congress has authorized a federal district court to 
issue an “order” to a person in the district “to give his testimony or statement or to produce a 
document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.”82 The U.S. 
Supreme Court has held that the statute gives lower federal courts the discretion to grant a section 
1782(a) discovery application based on certain factors.83  Various federal district courts have used 
their power under the statute to order discovery as to an international arbitration while other courts 
have not recognized that 28 U.S.C. section 1782 applies to international arbitrations.84     
The Arbitration Act 1996 of the United Kingdom authorizes parties to use the “same court 
procedures as are available in relation to legal proceedings to secure the attendance before the 
tribunal of a witness in order to give oral testimony or to produce documents or other material 
evidence.”85  As Professor Thomas Carbonneau has noted, the law enables English courts to “assist 
arbitral proceedings that are not located in the United Kingdom or that have yet to be localized in 
a particular national jurisdiction.”86  
Finally, U.S. courts have limited authority to vacate or not confirm an arbitral award.  One 
ground for non-enforcement or vacating the award relates to concerns about public policy.   
Although application of the public policy exception is limited, courts have critically examined 
arbitral tribunals’ legal reasoning in addressing the standard.  An example is Bayer CropScience 
AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, in which the district court was asked to confirm an arbitration 
                                                          
79 Stolt-Nielsen Transp. Grp., Inc., 430 F.3d at 577-78 (not reaching the issue, however, of whether section 7 authorizes 
pre-arbitration discovery).  
 
80 Life Receivables Tr. v. Syndicate 102 at Lloyd’s of London, 549 F.3d 210, 216-17 (2d Cir. 2008) (“we join the 
Third Circuit in holding that section 7 of the FAA does not authorize arbitrators to compel pre-hearing document 
discovery from entities not party to the arbitration proceedings”); see also Hay Group, Inc. v. E.B.S. Acquisition 
Corp., 360 F.3d 404, 407 (3d Cir. 2004).  
 
81  In re Security Life Ins. Co. of America, 228 F.3d 865, 871 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 
82 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1964).   
 
83 Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 246, 266 (2004). 
 
84 See Kenneth Beale, Justin Lugar, & Franz Schwarz, Solving the § 1782 Puzzle: Bringing Certainty to the Debate 
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award under the New York Convention for breach of a patent license agreement.87   Defendants 
moved to vacate the award under FAA, 9 U.S.C. sec. 10.88  The court readily dismissed the 
challenge not to confirm the award on public policy grounds, which the defendants couched in 
terms of a violation of the U.S. Constitution.89  One of the issues was whether the tribunal erred in 
not invalidating the patents on the grounds of “double patenting.”  Under the double patenting rule, 
an inventor is entitled to “one patent term per invention or improvement.”90  According to the 
district court, the arbitrators had addressed and rejected this issue on the grounds that the 
referenced patents were not commonly owned.91  In refusing to re-examine all of the nuances of 
the award, the court noted: “For the Court to now delve into whether the majority was wrong to 
reject the double patenting argument would be to reopen the record and analyze the case on the 
merits. The Court cannot and will not do so.”92  As to a second argument that the tribunal 
manifestly disregarded the fact that a claim as to a specific patent encompassed a specific gene, 
which invalidated the patent, the court again recognized that the tribunal had “thoroughly 
analyzed” the defense and argument.”93  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed 
the lower court’s confirmation of the award.94 Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit added an 
interesting twist as it held that the district court’s judgment applied an inappropriate post-judgment 
interest rate and thus revised the judgment on the interest rate.95     
As arbitration continues to touch on areas of public concern it is likely that the work of an 
arbitral tribunal could be at odds with another government entity, such as an agency, that is 
expressly charged with the development of the law.  One such area is antitrust law.  In particular, 
in Europe, the European Commission has the power under EU law to determine whether a grant 
by a Member State, or state aid, complies with the Treaty for the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU).  An arbitration award, which ordered a Member State to pay damages to an investor 
due to an EU decision previously withdrawing State aid, itself constituted a new form of State aid.  
As observed, in this instance, “a domestic court reviewing an award that constitutes State aid and 
                                                          
87 Bayer CropScience AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, No. 2:12cv47, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5571, at *11-12 (E.D. 
Va. Jan. 15, 2016). Why the NY Convention applied to the award is not clear other than the parties agreed that it did.  
Id. at *13. The arbitration clause provided that the place of arbitration was “the place of business of the defendant,” 
which is Indiana. The NY Convention applies when the arbitration award was made outside of the United States or 
when it is considered a non-domestic award.  NY Convention, supra note 49, art. I. 
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that has not been notified to the Commission has to rule that it is illegal and therefore breaches 
public policy.”96    
Along these lines, in the United States, the tension between the goal of arbitration and the 
desire to have a single forum to adjudicate claims of bankruptcy has courts drawing detailed lines.   
In core bankruptcy matters, priority is given to the bankruptcy court over the arbitral tribunal.97  
Addressing the tension, courts painstakingly sift through aspects of claims and a host of policy 
issues. 98  
Yet, even when not able to address fundamental concerns with the award, a court may 
express reservations, which in turn continues the dialogue with tribunals.  For example, U.S. 
federal district judge Max O. Cogburn, Jr. expressed frustration over the loss of law-making 
authority in the context of a broker-financial institution arbitration.99  The unfairness of arbitration 
was front and center as Judge Cogburn observed that “arbitration under the [FAA] is a process 
that, although retaining the appearance of constitutionality by involving the courts in confirming 
an award, does not even attempt to retain the appearance of fairness.”100 He followed his remark 
with the observation that the claimant bank has a “clear advantage” in arbitration, noting that 
counsel for the bank admitted that she “has never lost a single case” in arbitration.101  Concerns 
aside, Judge Cogburn enforced the award as mandated by the FAA yet vacated that portion of the 
award on attorney’s fees.  According to the court, the arbitration panel admitted that the amount 
of the fee award was unsubstantiated, or “‘pulled out of thin air,’” and thus was “completely 
arbitrary.”102 
 
V. CONCLUSION      
 
The debate about the role and value of arbitration is perhaps just beginning in earnest.  It 
is difficult to establish that the mere fact of an agreement to arbitrate means that the public is not 
engaged in dispute resolution.  Courts routinely review agreements to arbitrate and arbitration 
awards and information about the disputes is regularly disclosed in published judicial opinions.  
Further, courts are increasingly asked to address a range of issues related to the arbitration process.   
Of course, many arbitration matters never come within the review of courts; yet the courts are 
quite literally consumed with cases dealing with the fact of arbitration.  They are producing law 
                                                          
96 Damien Geradin, Public Policy and Breach of Competition Law in International Arbitration: A Competition Law 
Practitioner’s Viewpoint 14 (Tilburg Law & Economics Center, Discussion Paper No. 2016-029), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2786370 (quoting Tribunal de premier instances francophone de Bruxelles-Juge des Saisies, 
26 Jan 2016, in case R.G. 15/242/A). 
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EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 355, 360-76 (2012).   
 
98 Id; see also Kraken Inv. Ltd. v. Jacobs (In re Salander-O’Reilly Galleries, LLC), 475 B.R. 9 (D.C. N.Y. 2012). 
 
99 See generally Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC v. Watts, 858 F. Supp. 2d 591 (W.D.N.C. 2012).   
 
100 Id. at 595. 
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related to contracts, the relationship of one body of law, arbitration, to other bodies, and civil 
procedure, to name just some areas.   
Going forward, the key to ensuring that democratic values are not undermined is for courts 
to appreciate that within the existing legal regime there is room for oversight of the arbitration 
process.  Second, in exercising their oversight authority, courts should send clear signals to the 
parties and arbitrators regarding issues of potential public concern.  The process should be 
understood as ongoing as opposed to stagnant.  With these guides, the public and private could be 
better harmonized.     
 
 
